

Social Networks in the European Security and Defense Policy

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Abstract

In recent years an increasing number of authors have argued that the European Union can be described as an advanced form of transgovernmentalism. Whether called Europeanization, supranational intergovernmentalism, multilevel governance, administrative fusion or Brusselsization, the transgovernmentalist thesis states that European politics is shaped by the growing interaction of national government officials at every level of the decision-making process. Using a relational approach, this paper tests the transgovernmentalist thesis by looking at a hard case: the interaction of security officials in the context of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The data is based on a questionnaire that was administered to 73 defense officials in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and EU institutions, with a view to mapping out patterns of cooperation amongst them that may or may not fit with hierarchical lines. The results are analyzed through social network analysis. We find that the governance of ESDP is characterized by a weak form of transgovernmentalism, in which cross border links do exist but formal state actors retain strategic positions. In particular, two groups display transgovernmental features: a *core policy group* of crisis management and capability development officials in and around the Council, and a *Franco-German group* of capital-based defence actors.

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In recent years an increasing number of authors have argued that the European Union can be described as an advanced form of transgovernmentalism. Whether called Europeanization, supranational intergovernmentalism, multilevel governance, administrative fusion or Brusselsization, the transgovernmentalist argument states that European politics is shaped by the growing interaction of national government officials at every level of the decision-making process (Wallace and Wallace 2000; Regelsberger and Wessels 2005). In this paper, we explore the transgovernmentalist argument by looking at a hard case: the interaction of security officials in the context of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Mérand's (2008) qualitative research on ESDP actors suggests that there is indeed a great deal of administrative interaction between ESDP actors. But the evidence so far remains anecdotal. We use fresh data to refine and test this hypothesis through social network analysis.

The paper is part of a broader research project on the ESDP domain. To date scholars have no reliable, systematic and sociologically meaningful information on ESDP decision-making processes. The objective of our project is to map out the policy domain by identifying the position of actors, their social relations, their trajectory, and beliefs systems. Seventy-three interviews were conducted in France, the UK, Germany, and in Brussels. The information collected by our team will serve to explain specific cases of decision-making, such as the decision to launch a crisis management operation or to develop a procurement program.¹ In this paper, we look only at *social relations* between policy actors around ESDP in general. The picture that emerges confirms a weak form of transgovernmentalism in which cross border links between different policy actors have developed along functional lines but only among a handful of state actors who retain strategic positions.

More specifically, our relational approach to ESDP addresses two research questions. *First*, which actors occupy key strategic positions in the web of cooperation? We find that a few traditional national actors, namely PSC ambassadors, are located at the strategic core of the ESDP network. But these actors are Brussels-based, not capital-based, and we observe that there is a high density of social relations among domestic government actors in parallel to the formal meeting point of Council meetings. *Second*, is it possible to observe cohesive groups of actors who share particularly strong social relations among themselves across borders? This is a key question if we want to weigh the possibility that transgovernmental coalitions will emerge along transnational or functional lines to push (or block) specific ESDP initiatives. In our analysis, two groups display transgovernmental features: a functional *core policy group* of crisis management and capability development officials in and around the Council, and a political *Franco-German group* of capital-based defence actors. This suggests that while there is room for transgovernmental collective action, it will be limited to these narrow clusters of government officials.

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Security governance and networks

Several European security observers agree with Kirchner and Sperling (2007: 9) that “National authorities in the EU can no longer unilaterally fulfill their primary responsibilities of maintaining territorial integrity and ensuring economic growth. Not only do security threats now trespass into areas once considered to be strictly domestic, but the transformation of the European state has made it increasingly difficult to achieve its security goals owing to the vulnerabilities of the post-Westphalian state to external shocks. The mitigation of those vulnerabilities evades a national solution...” The concept of security governance describes how an increasing number of state and non-state actors interact with each other to produce security policy in overlapping institutional configurations, such as NATO, the EU, the OSCE, etc. (Webber et al. 2004; Hofmann 2009).

The security governance metaphor captures the growing overlap of the different forms of international cooperation defined by Keohane and Nye (1974) as intergovernmentalism, transnationalism, and transgovernmentalism. While intergovernmentalism describes traditional inter-state relations that take place exclusively via chiefs of government and the formal diplomatic machinery, transnationalism refers to increased interaction across different levels of society, thus including non-state actors and supranational organizations such as the EU in a more complex form of governance. Transgovernmentalism, finally, suggests that networks of government officials interact above and beneath formal state hierarchies along functional lines (for example in the context of international organizations or through transversal bureaucratic cooperation) to produce policy outcomes.

In the ESDP scholarship, the opposition between intergovernmentalism and transgovernmentalism is key to understand the debate between, on the one hand, realists and intergovernmentalists who believe that ESDP is an instrument in the hands of big states that pursue their national interest and, on the other hand, constructivists and institutionalists who argue that the EU is playing a key role in forging compromises in the ever more complex governance of European security. While this paper does not pretend to adjudicate between these two well-entrenched positions, we seek to make a first step in the direction of evaluating the extent to which ESDP has moved beyond formal inter-state relations.

Our paper is part of an emerging literature on “networked politics,” a relational approach to international relations that dovetails nicely with the governance approach (Krahmann 2005, Kahler 2009). Reinicke (1999), Raustiala (2002), and Slaughter (2004) have argued that we are witnessing the growth of cross border networks of government actors who underpin new forms of global governance above and beneath traditional inter-state relations. Recently, Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2006) have advocated the use of social network analysis to conceptualize and describe these networks. While there is a rich literature that promotes a metaphorical use of networks as *actors* in the global arena (e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998), social network analysis is a way to conceptualize networks as *social structures* that result from the development of social relations among a set of policy

actors.² The contribution of a structural approach is that it allows us to detect *informal* social relations *in addition* to formal ones. It is thus well suited to verify the growth of a social layer beneath formal state interactions, which is the key claim made by transgovernmentalists.

Structural approaches to EU decision-making have been applied to analyze influence in the common agricultural policy (Pappi and Henning 1999) and the transfer of social policy to Eastern Europe (Sissenich 2008). In security policy, the use of networks has been more metaphorical. Krahnemann (2005) and Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2009), for example, use qualitative methods to describe and compare emerging forms of security cooperation as well as their effects on global governance. We, by contrast, use structural analysis to map out the network of security actors with a view to uncover patterns of influence and cooperation in one specific policy domain. This, we believe, is the most systematic and sociologically meaningful way to test transgovernmentalism in European security policy.

Methods, data, and hypotheses

Borrowing from Sissenich's (2008) conceptualization, we operationalize transgovernmentalism as a policy-centered network in which formal state actors occupy key strategic positions (*gatekeepers*) but in the context of porous national boundaries (*weak border effects*). Although the concept of network is usually associated to transgovernmentalism in the governance literature, we can use structural network analysis to describe its main alternatives as well. *Graph 1* depicts a purely intergovernmentalist network in which chief executives or their representative in Brussels constitute gatekeepers. EU institutions are marginal. In Sissenich's conceptualization, there are strong border and gatekeeping effects. *Graph 2* describes our transgovernmentalist network hypothesis, in which a dense web of relations above and beneath formal hierarchies coalesce around EU institutions, but national state actors remain at the core of the network. Here border effects are weak but gatekeeping effects are strong. *Graph 3*, finally, depicts the transnationalist networks in which both state and nonstate actors, as well as EU institutions, are related in numerous ways above and beneath formal diplomatic links. Gatekeeping and border effects are non-existent.

-- Graphs 1,2,3 about here --

Our research strategy in this paper is to compare the "real" ESDP network to these three hypothetical forms of cooperation. The closer the real network resembles Graph 2, the strongest the case for transgovernmentalism. We conceive of an actor not as a person but as an organizational unit with unity of function. This includes the many divisions in a government department that deal with European security (for example the EU, CFSP and NATO desks as well as the political directorate and political staff in a foreign ministry) but

² Kahler (2009: 5), who proposes this distinction, defines structural networks as follows: "The ties or links among the actors (nodes) create a structure (a persistent pattern of relations) that in turn serves to constrain actors or provide opportunities for action."

also interest groups and think tanks that focus on ESDP. Appendix A provides the list of these actors and the acronyms we use. For time and budgetary reasons, we limited the scale of the network to French, German, British and Brussels-based actors (EU and NATO). There are sound theoretical reasons for beginning our analysis with the three main military powers and the two most important security organizations in Europe.

The “real” network was drawn from a standardized questionnaire administered to “key” ESDP actors in France, Germany, the UK and in Brussels (cf. Kriesi and Jegen 2001). Delineating the scale of a network is a tricky issue because it depends not on sampling but on analytical choices. Three criteria were used to identify the population of key ESDP actors: 1) we scanned the roster of every government department or interest group interested in security policy with a view to identifying decision-making units and observers in France, Germany, the UK, and in EU institutions (*positional criterion*); 2) we did an in-depth study of ESDP-related conferences, seminars, summits, etc. in order to extract actors who took a stand on ESDP issues on behalf of their organization (*participative criterion*); 3) we submitted the resulting list containing several hundred units to a small group of ESDP experts, who added key units they thought were missing, but also subtracted those they thought were too marginal to ESDP debates (*reputational criterion*). A final list of 100 ESDP actors was created on the basis of that last iteration.

The questionnaire was circulated between October 2007 and May 2009. Some questionnaires were administered in face-to-face interviews and others were left for the interviewee to fill out. The overall response rate is 73% (73 actors) but only 43% of the questionnaires could be used for the network section.³ Taken together, French, British and German actors represent 88% of our population. 30% are career diplomats, 15% military officers, 17% EU or national members of parliament, 17% academics, interest group or NGO people, and 14% civilian officials (e.g. civilian official working in a defence ministry or EU civil servant). Some diplomats and military officers are seconded to EU institutions, usually the Council Secretariat. Thirty-one percent work in Brussels and the remainder in national capitals.

Using the Pajek software package for social network analysis, we propose two different approaches to test our general hypothesis of transgovernmentalism. First, we draw a collaboration network to detect who regulates the flow of cooperation. Respondents were asked who they had cooperated with in the past 2 years on ESDP files. We defined cooperation as the intensive exchange of important information and joint work towards the development of common positions. Network analysis produces a structural index of brokerage, called *gatekeeping*, that does not depend on formal channels of influence but on the ability to control the flow of cooperation towards one’s subgroup. A higher score for formal state representatives suggests that the policy domain is dominated by a logic of intergovernmental cooperation; conversely, an even distribution of gatekeeping scores among EU and domestic government actors suggests the prevalence of a logic of transgovernmental cooperation.

³ Some respondents did not fill out the network matrix, or did not fill it out properly, which generates missing data.

Second, we use the same collaboration network to uncover cohesive groups by looking at the *constellation of actors*. Using “structural equivalence” to produce cohesive groups does not tell us who is important in the network but whether there are *border effects*. If the network’s cohesive groups (clusters) consist of actors that belong to the same country and not others, intergovernmentalism is vindicated because this means that they have only a few links across borders. If, on the other hand, we find that national actors do not form cohesive groups, and actors are linked to one another in different ways across borders, this suggests that some form of transgovernmentalism is taking place. It is of course possible that the network fits between these two hypothetical models.

Graph 4 shows the full ESDP network. Each country/institution is represented by a different vertex color. To produce an optimal layout, Pajek uses an automated energy command (Kamada-Kawai) that moves vertices to locations that minimize the variation in line length. The visual graph does not mean anything substantive.

-- G4 about here --

Beyond National Gatekeeping?

In this section, we identify ESDP’s main brokers. We assume that certain actors occupy strategic positions in the network that depend on their ability to control the flow of cooperation. Brokerage suggests that some actors control access to specific subgroups. The disappearance of these brokers would break the network into constituent parts.⁴ Brokerage is not a measure of the number of one’s cooperative ties, which is given by degree centrality and is not covered in this paper, but of the importance of one’s ties in bridging different components of the network, that is, in keeping the policy domain together. There are different definitions of brokerage. Here we use the gatekeeper role, which regulates the flow of information to his or her own group (de Nooy et al. 2005: 151). More specifically, we define 7 groups in the network: France, UK, Germany, EU, NATO, interest groups, and think tanks. These 3 governmental, 2 intergovernmental and 2 nonstate groups correspond to the main institutionalized categories of actors in the ESDP field.

Gatekeepers can be ranked according to the number of incomplete triads in which the actor is a broker. Table 1 displays a list of the top 16 gatekeepers in the ESDP network based on two different matrices. For each actor, we give two scores : Column A is the score based on the original matrix of collaborative ties. Column B is the score based on the “symmetrized” matrix. To symmetrize, we produce an undirected network in which any identified cooperation, regardless of whether it was reported by only one or the two actors involved, is considered to be a tie. In other words, in the symmetrized matrix, we assume that cooperative ties are necessarily reciprocal, while in the original matrix, we did not. Symmetrization is a common procedure in social network analysis to address the problem

⁴ Technically, a broker is a vertex whose removal creates a structural hole and thus increases the number of separate components in the network.

of missing data but it has the potential effect of skewing the data. For example, an actor who identified a large number of collaborative ties could end up being a broker even though this actor was not necessarily identified as a collaborator by others. To correct this potential bias, we eliminated from the network actors who reported an unreasonably high number of cooperative ties relative to the number of times they were themselves identified as collaborators. But the best remedy is to cross check the original and symmetrized results.

Although the substantial overlap of Column A and Column B (for the top 16 positions) is evidence of the reliability of the symmetrical matrix vis-à-vis the non-symmetrical matrix, the ranking of gatekeepers is altered. Cross checking the two columns suggests that the gatekeeping score of four actors (colored in black: the German foreign ministry's political directorate, the strategic policy division of the French foreign ministry, the French defence staff, the UK defence staff, and the EU Council Secretariat's political-military DG) is probably underestimated in the original matrix, while that of four other actors (in green: Aerospace and Defence Industry Association of Europe, EU Military Committee, EU Military Staff, and Auswärtiges Amt's policy planning staff) is probably overestimated. This is due to the fact that gatekeeping considers the flow of cooperation *to* one's group and not *from* one's group in the original matrix, while both flows are considered in the symmetrized matrix. To our knowledge, there are no methodological grounds to choose one ranking over the other.

Taken as a whole, the results presented in Table 1 are nonetheless instructive. Regardless of which matrix is used, the three PSC ambassadors are in the 6 top gatekeeping positions. This means that: (1) formal diplomatic representatives are the main point of contact between their domestic colleagues and other ESDP actors; (2) they generally retain key strategic positions in the ESDP network. But, in contrast to the pre-ESDP era when capital-based political directors controlled the agenda, these actors are permanently based in Brussels where they interact on a weekly basis. Other national gatekeepers include: in Germany, the capital-based political directorate and the defence ministry's EU division; in France, the defence ministry's strategic affairs delegation; and, in the UK but to a much lesser extent, the defence staff. Overall this suggests that gatekeeping by state actors is strong across the ESDP domain, but stronger in Germany than in the UK where control over the flow of cooperation is more diffuse.

Gatekeeping effects among EU institutions are weaker. Indeed, several political-military bodies seem to play a minor brokering role: the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff, the European Defence Agency, and the Council Secretariat's DG for political-military affairs, to which one should add the European Parliament's security and defence subcommittee. This is due to the fact that, by virtue of their coordination mandate, each of these organizational units has to cultivate relations with a fairly wide range of actors from different EU member states. Among interest groups, the Aerospace and Defence Industry Association of Europe leads stands out: this is not surprising given that it represents 30 industry associations in Brussels. More interesting is the gatekeeping role played by the Centre for European Reform, which despite the fact that it is based in London, has been arguably the most active think tank with regards to ESDP since 2000, with several remarked publications and events.

Table 1. Gatekeeping Scores in the ESDP Network

	Non-symmetrical collaboration network	Symmetrical collaboration network
UKPR	36	184
German PR	35	117
European Parliament SEDE	30	86
BMVg Fü S III EU	28	134
French PR	24	334
ADIAE	21	41
EU Military Committee	20	38
AA Policy Staff	19	47
French Defence Ministry DAS	19	127
EU Military Staff	19	36
Centre for European Reform	16	85
European Defence Agency	15	70
AA Political Directorate	12	767
MAE Strategic/Political Dir.	3	96
UK Defence Staff	1	59
Council DG-E	0	65
French Defence Staff	0	72

The first cut in the network yields a picture that is both nuanced and faithful to ESDP's terms of reference, one in which formal state representatives occupy strategic positions. The "ambassador as gatekeeper" image of intergovernmentalism holds roughly. Despite this privileged status, however, PSC ambassadors do not fully control the dense flow of cooperation that crisscrosses the network and easily transcends borders. Other government actors, especially civilian officials in defence and foreign ministries, also control access to domestic subnetworks. Interestingly, political leaders, such as 10 Downing Street, the foreign minister's cabinet or the High Representative's staff, are remote from the main channels of cooperation. In line with the transgovernmentalist thesis, our findings thus suggest a fairly high degree of interaction among actors from different countries, which may sometimes leads to genuine cooperation across borders, but predominantly along narrow bureaucratic lines.

We also find that different administrations are structured differently, gatekeeping being more diffused in London and Brussels than in Paris or Berlin. In general, PSC ambassadors and the ADIAE derive a prominent gatekeeping role from their mandate as government or industry *representatives* while EU institutions, which are supposed to act as *coordinators*, exhibit weaker gatekeeping strength and are thus more porous to transgovernmental influences.

Crossing Borders

We now turn to a closer analysis of border effects, which is the second dimension of the transgovernmentalism argument. One way of measuring border effects is to map out the constellation of actors. We want to see which actors have similar patterns of ties. This measure, called “structural equivalence” in social network analysis, can be used in a blockmodeling procedure. A blockmodel describes the structure of a network and the position of each vertex within this structure, here with respect to structural equivalence.⁵ Actors who are related to each other and belong to structurally equivalent positions can be assumed to form cohesive subgroups. The image matrix will then show complete groups along the main diagonal (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 419). Because they display similar collaborative ties, actors who belong to the same cluster are more likely to form a cohesive group that will push for specific policy initiatives. While intergovernmentalism assumes that such clusters will be structured along national lines, transgovernmentalism predicts that they will be structured along functional lines and across borders.

Here we use the symmetrized network. Table 2 depicts the image matrix and error matrix for a blockmodel with 7 assigned clusters. The image matrix shows 3 cohesive subgroups, illustrated by the presence of a complete [com] block on the diagonal. The members of these groups are listed on Table 3. Block 3 includes French defence officials and EU Council Secretariat staff. Block 4 includes EU political-military bodies, also located in the Council Secretariat, the French foreign ministry’s political director, and the British defence staff and Permanent Representation. These two groups, we would argue, form the core of the ESDP bureaucratic machinery, both in Brussels and in the capitals. Block 6 depicts a group of capital-based, mostly defence ministry-related Franco-German actors. (Block 5 consists of a lonesome German political director.) Thus, we have at least 3 fairly transgovernmental clusters of structurally equivalent actors. These are not trivial groups: 14 of their members are among the top 16 gatekeepers.

⁵ Blockmodeling is performed by rearranging the matrix of collaborative ties until we find clusters (“blocks”) of structural equivalence wherein error is minimized (the error score being the number of ties that do not fit a perfect structural equivalence pattern).

Table 2. Image and Error Matrix - 7 assigned clusters

Final Image Matrix:

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	-	-	com	-	com	-	-
3	-	com	com	com	com	com	-
4	-	-	com	com	com	-	-
5	-	com	com	com	-	com	com
6	-	-	com	-	com	com	-
7	-	-	-	-	com	-	-

Final Error Matrix:

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	100	16	36	33	0	7	51
2	16	2	8	7	1	4	10
3	36	8	0	6	0	11	39
4	33	7	6	8	0	16	36
5	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
6	7	4	11	16	1	8	36
7	51	10	39	36	0	36	50

Final error = 804.000

Table 3. Complete blocks of structural equivalence*

3 - Bureau MDN-EU	4 - COPS	5 - AA Political	6 - AA Policy
3 - DG E-External	4 - EDA		6 - BMVg FÜ S III EU
3 - EUMS	4 - EUMC		6 - BMVg Policy
3 - FPR COPS	4 - MAE Strat		6 - Chancellery
3 - MDN DAS	4 - MoD Chief of Defense Staff		6 - EMIA-EU
	4 - SG/HR Cabinet		6 - GPR Mil
	4 - UKPR Mil		6 - MDN Cabinet
	4 - UKPR PolMil		

*navy blue indicates that the actor belongs to the EU; pale blue to France; yellow to Germany; red to the UK

These results are also quite robust. Roughly the same constellation of actors is found when running a blockmodeling procedure with 4, 5, 6 or 8 assigned clusters. Although the structural equivalence position of some actors changes, we find each time one or two transgovernmental groups of *core ESDP actors* that include Council Secretariat bodies, the Brussels-based permanent representations, and sometimes key ESDP decision-makers from the capitals, along with a small *Franco-German group* centered around the German political directorate, the German defence ministry and the French defence ministry. Four procedures out of 5 also generated a small group of *German-only decision-makers*. None of the parliamentary, interest group, think tank or functional (non-ESDP) government divisions belong to a cohesive group in any of the blockmodels (that is, they may be in a structurally equivalent position but not with respect to each other).

This suggests that there exist two cohesive groups in the ESDP domain. First, the core policy group of crisis management and capability development officials, which brings together the

Council Secretariat, the permanent representations, and a number of capital-based security officials. Second, we consistently find a smaller but very robust Franco-German group of foreign and (mostly) defence officials who are based in their capitals. This is evidence of an intensive border crossing that is however limited to a very small number of government officials. Although other ESDP actors are not completely trapped by their national borders, as shown in the presence of multiple transnational ties in Graph 4, there are few structurally equivalent positions across borders that would suggest any basis for cohesion and collective action. While a modicum of transgovernmentalism is definitely taking place, we find no trace of transnationalism or security governance beyond government actors.

Conclusion

This social network analysis of the ESDP domain provides tentative answers to our two research questions. Using cooperation as an indicator, we observe that the actors who are formally responsible for speaking on behalf of their state, namely the PSC ambassadors, play a key operational role. These actors act as gatekeepers for their respective domestic government arena. Especially around EU institutions, the network is quite dense and contains a number of transversal links between bureaucratic actors from different countries, some of whom also provide access to important sections of the network, but they do not go beyond what is expected of formal bureaucratic interaction. By and large, political leaders, interest groups and think tanks are marginal.

The transgovernmentalist thesis finds greater support when looking at the constellation of actors in structurally equivalent positions. We discern two potential coalitions that cross national boundaries: *a core policy group* of crisis management and capability development officials in and around the Council, and a Franco-German group of capital-based defence actors. While the former is mainly functional in character, the latter looks more political and could be related to 50 years of close Franco-German cooperation. Thus, there are clear elements of transgovernmentalism in the ESDP domain, but the phenomenon seems limited to a narrow group of officials. What emerges from this structural approach is a policy domain in which intergovernmentalism and a limited form of transgovernmentalism coexist as forms of security governance.

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
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
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
Graph 1. Intergovernmentalism




Graph 2. Transgovernmentalism



Graph 3. Transnationalism



G4. The ESDP Cooperation Network



Annex A. List of actors in the ESDP network

Chancellery BMVg Cabinet	German Chancellery German Federal Ministry of Defense Cabinet German Federal Ministry of Defense Directorate General of Armaments Rüstung International
BMVg Rüstung III	Armaments Affairs German Federal Ministry of Defense Chief of Staff, Bundeswehr Führungs III
BMVg Führungs III EU	German Federal Ministry of Defense Policy Planning and Advisory Staff
BMVg Policy Bundestag Def Comm Bundestag FA Comm CDU	German Parliament Defense Committee German Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee German Christian Democratic Union German Free Democratic Party
FDP SPD AA Cabinet AA Policy	German Social Democratic Party German Federal Foreign Office Cabinet German Federal Foreign Office Policy Planning Staff German Federal Foreign Office Political Directorate- General
AA Political	German Federal Foreign Office Political Directorate- General for Africa
AA Africa	German Federal Foreign Office Political Directorate- General EU-KOR CFSP Unit
AA EUKOR GPR Mil GPR Political GPR NATO	German Permanent Representation Military Policy German Permanent Representation Political Affairs German Permanent Representation NATO
Cabinet PM	French Prime Minister Cabinet
Presidency MAE Cabinet	French Presidency French Foreign Affairs Ministry Cabinet
MAE CE	French Foreign Affairs Ministry European Cooperation French Foreign Affairs Ministry Directorate General for Policy and Security Department of Strategic Affairs, Security and Disarmament
MAE Strat	French Foreign Affairs Ministry Analysis and Forecast Centre
MAE CAP MDN Cabinet	French National Defense Ministry Cabinet French National Defense Ministry Delegation for Strategic Affairs
MDN DAS	French National Defense Ministry Armament General Delegation
MDN Armament	French National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee
Nat Ass Foreign Aff Comm Nat Ass Def and Armed force	French National Assembly Defense and Armed

Comm	Forces Committee
PS	French Socialist Party
UMP	French Union pour un mouvement populaire Party
SGDN	French National Defense General Secretariat
FPR COPS	French Permanent Representation Political and Security Committee
FPR Mil	French Permanent Military Representation
FPR NATO	French Permanent Representation NATO
EMIA	French Defense Staff
EMIA Euroatlan	French Defense Staff Euro-Atlantic Division
Downing Street	UK Prime Minister Cabinet
Conservative	UK Conservative Party
Labour	UK Labour Party
Liberal Democratic	UK Liberal Democratic Party
FCO Cabinet	UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Cabinet
FCO CFSP	UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office EU Directorate-General CFSP Unit
FCO Asia	UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Asia Directorate
FCO Policy	
FCO Africa	UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Africa Directorate
FCO Security	UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office DG Political International Security Directorate
MoD EU/NATO	UK Ministry of Defense EU/NATO
MoD Policy Staff	UK Ministry of Defense Policy Staff
MoD Cabinet	UK Ministry of Defense
MoD Chief of Defense Staff	UK Ministry of Defense Cabinet
MoD Def Procurement Agency	UK Ministry of Defense Chief of the Defense Staff
Parliament For Aff Committee	UK Ministry of Defense Defense Procurement Agency
Parliament Def Committee	UK Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee
UKPR PolMil	UK Parliament Defense Committee
UKPR Mil	UK Permanent Representation POL-MIL Team
DFID Security	UK Permanent Representation Military Representation to EU and NATO
DFID Human	
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
Bureau Euro Pol Advisers	Bureau of European Policy Advisers
COPS	Council of EU Political and Security Committee
PES	Party of European Socialists
PPE	European People's Party

ALDE	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
EP	European Parliament
SEDE	European Union Parliament AFET - Committee on Foreign Affairs SEDE - Sub-committee on Security and Defense
DNAT	European Union Parliament DNAT - Delegation for Relations with NATO Parliamentary Assembly
SG/HR Cabinet	General Secretariat of the Council of the EU Secretary General's Staff
DG E-External	Council of EU Directorate General E-External Relation and Political-Military Affairs
DG Industry	European Commission Enterprise and Industry Directorate General
EDA	European Defense Agency
DG RELEX	European Commission External Relations Directorate General
DG Development	European Commission Development Directorate General
EUMS	European Union military staff
ESDC	European Security and Defence College
ADIAE	Aerospace and Defense Industries Association of Europe
EUROMIL	European Organisation of Military Associations
AgustaWestland	AgustaWestland
BAE Systems	BAE Systems
Coface	Coface
Dassault Aviation	Dassault Aviation
DCN (France)	DCN (France)
Diehl Stiftung	Diehl Stiftung
EADS	EADS
Finnemeccanica	Finnemeccanica
Groupe Suez	Groupe Suez
Krauss-Maffei Wegmann	Krauss-Maffei Wegmann
Lockheed Martin	Lockheed Martin
Rheinmetall AG	Rheinmetall AG
Rhode & Schwarz	Rhode & Schwarz
Thales	Thales
NATO PA	NATO Parliamentary Assembly
NATO Sec Gen	NATO Secretary General
NATO EU Def Pol Aff	NATO EU Defense Policy Affairs
NATO International Staff	NATO International Staff
NATO Milit Int'l Staff	NATO International Military Staff
NATO Military Committee	NATO Military

NATO SHAPE	Committee NATO SHAPE Western
WEU	European Union
CEPS	Centre for European Policy Studies
GMFUS	German Marshall Fund of the United States
DGAP	Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik Foreign Policy
FPC	Centre Centre for European Reform
CER	Chatham House
Chatham	European Council on Foreign Relations
ECFR	European Union Institute for Security Studies
EUISS	Fondation pour la recherche stratégique
FRS	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung	Institut français des relations internationales
IFRI	Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques
IRIS	International Crisis Group
ICG	Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
SWP	Security and Defense Agenda
SDA	International Institute For Strategic Studies
IISS	Royal United Services Institute
RUSI	Défense Conseil International
Défense Conseil International	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung	Munich Conference on Security Policy
MCSP	International Security Information Service - Europe
ISIS	European Policy Centre
EPC	