

## ST 45 : Formes de compétence et savoirs de gouvernement

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Deuxième session : *Circulation et convergence des formes de compétence – Introduction bilingue sur l'état de la question*

### THE WORLD BANK AND THE REFORM OF WASTE MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENTS IN BURKINA FASO AND GHANA: BUILDING CAPACITIES OF LOCAL CIVIL SERVANTS OR DISQUALIFYING THEIR SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE?

In Accra and Kumasi, the Waste Management Departments (WMDs) were created out of the Public Health Departments (PHDs) along the implementation of the Urban Environmental Sanitation Project (UESP) financed by the World Bank. They were progressively granted more autonomy and are now a model for the PHDs that are still officially their mother departments. In Burkina Faso, a similar type of assistance was granted by the *Projet d'Amélioration des Conditions de Vie Urbaine* (PACVU).<sup>1</sup> In the city of Bobo-Dioulasso the implications of reform are less visible but the *Direction de la Propreté* of Ouagadougou underwent transformations similar to that observed in the two Ghanaian cities. Although there were significant differences in the historical process of institutionalization of the departments, the assistance granted can help to explain the convergence in the models of professionalization in the four cities. The urban development projects studied in this research paper deeply affected the idea of competence in these departments through the introduction of new skills and knowledge.

The urban development sector gained a strategic importance during the 1980s for the World Bank. The rapid growth of cities around the World and specifically in Sub-Saharan Africa was used as an argument for a more intensive intervention in the urban development sector. At the end of this decade, the focus on urban management prompted the World Bank to adopt a more holistic approach to urban development. There was a progressive shift from infrastructure projects to institutional strengthening and urban service delivery. In 1986, the World Bank, UNDP and UNCHS-Habitat<sup>2</sup> jointly put in place the *Urban Management Programme*. As much as a renovated interest for urban development, this programme led to a shift from a town-planning to an institutional perspective centred around the concept of *urban management* (De Ponte, 2002: 237).

In Ghana and Burkina Faso, the reforms of the policies of solid waste management (SWM) were characterised by a process of privatisation of solid waste collection and the building of engineered landfill sites for the disposal of household waste. The projects included a number of initiatives to redefine the regulatory framework of environmental sanitation. They were

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<sup>1</sup> The first phase of the Urban Environmental Sanitation Project (UESP I) was financed by the International Development Association (IDA) credit 2836-GH in the amount of US\$71.0 million equivalent and approved on March 26, 1996. The project was extended for one year and eventually closed at the end of 2003. It was followed by a repeater project (UESP II) – project P082373 – approved April 29, 2004 for the amount US\$71.0 million equivalent.

In Burkina Faso, the *Projet d'Amélioration des Conditions de Vie Urbaine* (PACVU) was approved on May 23, 1995 for the amount of US\$51.1 Million. A Supplemental Credit was approved by the Bank on March 28, 2002 and the final cost was US\$67.8 Million. The project closed on June 26, 2005 while the original date was June 26, 2000. In 2007, the Bank approved another project in the urban sector – the *Decentralized Urban Capacity Building Project* – that is not a repeater project but includes a SWM component for the cities of Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso.

<sup>2</sup> United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Centre for Human Settlement (UNCHS).

also associated to organisational changes and the introduction of financial management and technical changes in every one of the cities. The very idea of competence evolved and considerable efforts were made to modify the agents' professional practices.<sup>3</sup> For the majority of the personnel, the contracting-out of waste collection to the private sector induced deep transformations. In Ghana, the Project-Wide Capacity-Building and Training (PWCBT) component of the UESP project included the financing of a great number of workshops for the civil servants and the provision of technical assistance by local and international consultants. In Burkina Faso, very few training opportunities were given to the staff under the PACVU. However, several cooperation agencies provided training opportunities to the top civil servants. On average, the population is much younger than in Ghana, and the initial qualifications are higher. In Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, the issue was to create competencies rather than to transform them as we will try to demonstrate.

The question of policy convergence as a result of policy transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; 2000) is used as the main entry to study the circulation of the forms of competencies. Is there a diffusion of an international model of competencies? How does this model help us to understand the changes in the competencies of the agents of the WMDs? In this paper, we have chosen to study the history of the WMDs since the middle 1990s, at the beginning of the implementation of the Urban Environmental Sanitation Project and the *Projet d'Amélioration des Conditions de Vie Urbaine* of the World Bank. Both projects provided assistance to an ambitious programme of reform of the WMDs. They modified the image of the local civil servants by prescribing new conceptions of the public policies of SWM and also transformed the daily activities of the civil servants. This study aims to give insights on the transformation of competencies in municipal departments "shaped" by international cooperation. However, various authors have emphasized the importance of the local conditions of the production of public policies (Saurugger and Surel, 2006; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse-Kappen, 2001; Clavier, 2007).

The competencies as they were developed within the framework of the projects belong to a strand of reform that has been intensely studied in various countries of Europe and Northern America. Thus, it is relevant to wonder if we observe a process of harmonisation of the modes of public management in Ghana and Burkina Faso. But how do the contexts of intervention affect the models of competencies? Is the intervention of a multilateral cooperation agency creating some sort of a specific relation of administrative reform? Eventually, it cannot be taken for granted that the circulation of an international model affects the competencies of the civil servants. Is it relevant to study the prescription of norms in the course of the project? Or is it more helpful to consider that the competencies are shaped by the displacement of the rules of the game in the administrative departments?

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<sup>3</sup> This paper is based of a research fieldwork led from Oct. to Dec. 2008. Over 50 interviews with local civil servants were realised in the four cities. A majority of the qualified staff of the WMDs of the four cities were met, notably of those targeted by the capacity-building components of the projects. The unqualified staffs (drivers, street-sweepers, security wards, etc.) were not included in the sample as there is no consistent programme to upgrade their competencies.

## **1. The Implementation of Projects Influenced by an International Movement of Reforms**

### **1.1. The Disqualification of the Solid Waste Management Policies**

The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) signed in the 1980s and 1990s in the developing countries more often led to massive cuts in public spending and reductions payroll in the public sector. However, the introduction of the notion of *urban management* at the end of the 1980s and the set up of the *Urban Management Programme* (UMP) jointly by the World Bank and the UNDP spread the idea that the municipal authorities had to be supported. This turning point in multilateral development assistance impacted the policies of SWM that started to become a priority for these agencies. However, the argument that there is a need for capacity-building at the local level was most often based on the disqualification of the civil servants' competencies. In Ghana, the argument was made clear in the *Staff Appraisal Report* (SAR) of the UESP project. It gives an illustration of the picturing of the WMDs at the time of the preparation of the project:

*"No precise data are available on the actual costs per ton of solid waste collection in Ghana's main cities. However, the low efficiency of present services is evident in low utilization rates of municipal collection equipment, overstaffing, and cumbersome procedures. Data from other countries suggests that competition encourages the public sector to significantly improve its efficiency and to lower costs." (World Bank, 1996: 35)*

It would be difficult to argue that the local departments functioned properly at the time, the under-use of equipment – associated to poor maintenance and lack of fuel – hindering operations. The management of the departments at that time was quite informal and the views expressed in the SAR seem to stem from a dominant discourse rather than an in-depth analysis of the SWM policies. In turn, a report produced by the British consultancy Carlbro in 2001 emphasized the need for a better training and a greater number of civil servants in the field of environmental sanitation (MLGRD, 2001b).

The reforms implemented under World Bank projects UESP and PACVU must be understood in a broader context of public service reform. In 1992, Osborne and Gaebler published a book that gained some momentum in the field of *Policy Analysis*. The book, called *Reinventing Government*, described the said "shift from provider to enabler role of the government" in economic development as well as public action. Several years later, another book by Stoker and Stewart focused more precisely on the privatisation of urban services (Stoker and Stewart, 1995). Although the first one has been described as "both prescriptive and analytical" (Thomas, 1998: 130), both pieces of work illustrate the various attempts to implement reforms of the *New Public Management* type in advanced economies. World Bank strategies for the urban services in Africa can be compared with similar attempts in Europe and North America. At that time, innovative models of public action started to pervade the international development policies of the World Bank. In 1995, the institution published a milestone document: *Better Urban Services. Finding the Right Incentives* (World Bank, 1995). It contained most of the elements generally associated to the *New Public Management* and most importantly it reconsidered the role of the state. In 2004, another document was still putting the emphasis on private service provision but made clearer the objective of improving the conditions of the most vulnerable in the cities (World Bank, 2004).

## ***1.2. The UESP and PACVU Projects: a Similar Programme of Reform***

In Burkina Faso and Ghana, these transformations reached the operational level through two urban development projects. The Second Urban Development Project in Burkina Faso<sup>4</sup>, already mentioned the option of a contracting-out SW transportation. At the time, it was contemplated that contracts could be signed between the states and private enterprises or even local governments. Interestingly, this was not implemented at the time and the second project actually granted support to the Municipal Technical Services through equipment and a subsidy of their running costs for the duration of the project.

The UESP and PACVU projects illustrate a turning point in World Bank intervention. They put the emphasis on sanitation and financed the implementation of privatised SWM systems.<sup>5</sup> In Ghana, the Urban Environmental Sanitation Project (UESP) was the first project dedicated to urban sanitation. At a time when the principle of the participation of private contractors in urban services was becoming the norm, UESP aimed at implementing complex arrangements for the collection, transportation and treatment of solid waste. The idea was that the municipal WMDs should only take care of the collection in one area of the city, the others being contracted out to private contractors. The project proposed to set up a system of franchising. It involved a lot of organizational change in the management of solid waste.

It is virtually the same system that was to be implemented in Burkina Faso. The main difference lied at the primary collection level. While in Ghana, the system of *communal containers* is still in use alongside to door-to-door collection, the decision was made in Burkina Faso to remove them progressively so that door-to-door collection can increase.<sup>6</sup> There was an emphasis on primary collection and two essential aspects of it:

- *the structuring of the relatively small private contractors and;*
- *the sensitization of the population in order to bring them to pay a monthly fee.*

The decision to concentrate on the contracting out of solid waste management and the reluctance of the World Bank to finance equipment for the WMDs progressively marginalised the municipal departments from the provision of the service. In the two Ghanaian cities, this process is complete as all the zones were contracted out. In Burkina Faso, at the closure of the PACVU in 2005, the system was not yet fully operational. In Ouagadougou works for the landfill site were not completed until 2005 and the Direction de la Propreté (DP) still takes in charge about half of the transportation of the waste. On the contrary, it totally stepped out of the primary collection and has since been replaced by the private contractors. In the city of Bobo-Dioulasso, the contrast is important. In 2005, the landfill site was opened but the municipal council soon realised that it could not afford the system designed. The only private contractor in charge of transportation and treatment pulled out. Up until now, the *Service propreté* of the city is still collecting and transporting waste to the outskirts of the city. There

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<sup>4</sup> A credit in the amount of US\$22.2 million was approved on October 24, 1989. An additional credit, in the amount of US\$10 million was approved on November 10, 1994. The two credits were closed on March 31, 1997, whereas the original closing date was June 30, 1996.

<sup>5</sup> The SWM component of the PACVU eventually amounted to US\$7.8 million and other expenses were closely related to SWM – e.g. local resource mobilization, technical assistance and community participation. For UESP I, the SWM component amounted to US\$18.93 million and it was topped up by the Project-Wide Capacity Building and Training (PWCBT) Program, financed by the *Nordic Development Fund* (NDF) and the *Association of Netherlands Municipalities* (VNG), covering environmental sanitation and municipal finances.

<sup>6</sup> The citizens can drop their waste for free in the *communal containers*. This system allows for a better collection rate as it removes the financial obstacle to the dumping of waste but it is considered as less sustainable financially as the door-to-door collection fee paid by the households finances the transportation of the waste to the landfill sites.

is a coexistence of this form of collection that is entirely public and limited to the main markets and a private door-to-door collection that is not well structured.

Over the period, the changes have been widespread in all cities but Bobo-Dioulasso where the situation actually deteriorated. With the experience of almost fifteen years of implementation of the reform of the policies of SWM in these cities, it can be said that the objectives were ambitious. Landfill sites were opened in Kumasi and Ouagadougou, but not in Bobo-Dioulasso. In Accra, land rights issues blocked the construction of such a landfill for almost ten years and the works still have not started. Franchising agreements were indeed signed in all cities but the municipal councils were not fully able to play their regulatory role. Above all, the financial situation of all cities made it difficult to make the systems operational. Burkina Faso's PACVU was followed by a project called *Pôles Régionaux de Développement* in 2004. Aimed at the medium cities of the country, it was decided to finance further the SWM in Bobo-Dioulasso and Ouagadougou as the reforms were not fully implemented. In Ghana, the first phase of UESP was closed in 2003 but it was immediately followed by a second phase in order to deal with the "sustainability" of the system, most notably the financial aspects of it.

Even though the implementation of UESP and PACVU was hampered by a series of obstacles, the projects did play a major role in the institutionalisation of the Waste Management Departments in the four cities.

## ***2. The Historical Structuring of the Waste Management Departments***

### ***2.1. The Creation of the Waste Management Departments***

The four cities differ notably with respect to the institutionalisation of the municipal departments in charge of the SWM. In Ghana, the municipal authorities had long enjoyed the competency of SWM while in Burkina Faso, a national agency – the ONASENE<sup>7</sup> – had been in charge of this policy since 1988. During the 1990s, the competency was handed back to the technical departments of the municipalities that were thus in charge of solid and liquid waste management together with other services such as street cleansing, urban roads, public estate, and so on. One of the objectives of the PACVU was to create autonomous WMDs. In Ouagadougou, the *Direction de la Propreté* was created in 2001. In Bobo-Dioulasso, the local authorities refused to create such a department and set up a *Service Propreté* (Urban Sanitation Unit). At the time of writing, this unit only has two employees. It is integrated in the Urban Roads Department and has no specific budget or equipment.

In Ghana, the WMDs were originally part of the Public Health Departments (PHDs) and they are still officially attached to them today. Accra WMD was created as early as the mid-1980s when a project of the German cooperation agency (Kfw-Gtz) in the field of SWM was launched. It assisted the department with the provision of equipment and technical support to the department's workshop. It is almost ten years later, in 1994, that Kumasi WMD was created. The creation took place as the British Overseas Development Administration (ODA)<sup>8</sup> granted support to SWM in Kumasi. At this time, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) also had a project in the field of liquid waste management that is also a competency of this department. Contrary to what happened in Burkina Faso, the WMD of Accra and Kumasi already existed at the time of the approval of the UESP project.

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<sup>7</sup> *Office National des Services d'Entretien, de Nettoyage et d'Embellissement* – Urban Environment Public Utility (ONASENE).

<sup>8</sup> This agency was transformed in *Department for International Development* (DFID) in 1997.

There is another important difference between the two countries. In Burkina Faso, the employees are local civil servants. There is no exchange of personnel between the cities. In Ghana, in spite of the decentralisation movement, the local employees are mostly state civil servants. They are paid by the *Controller and Accountant General Department (CAGD)* and their positions are decided by this government structure and the *Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs)*, the regional administration. Only the cleaners, drivers, and security officers are recruited at the local level. Most agents are thus state-employed. Every three years, they can be nominated anywhere in the country. In practice, the mobility of the agents in Accra and Kumasi WMD is less important than that of other local civil servants, and largely regional. The creation of these departments being fairly recent, and the number of agent being almost negligible, they still belong to the body of the Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) that staffs the Public Health Departments. As such, their typical careers are quite homogeneous. Most of them graduated in one of the three School of Hygiene in the country. Only the five biggest cities in Ghana have a WMDs. The civil servants generally started their careers in small District Assemblies before being nominated in Accra or Kumasi. It is only at this point that they learnt the basics of SWM. Due to the proximity with the Public Health Departments (PHDs), the professional ethos of the staff is characterised by a reliance on public sensitization and environmental inspections.

This ethos was challenged by the implementation of the World Bank UESP and PACVU. The insistence on some aspects such as contracting-out and financial management induced a shift in emphasis from technical to managerial competencies. Its implications can provide information on the circulation of competency models in the four cities.

## ***2.2. The Shift of Privatisation***

A look at the successive reorganisations of the departments allows us to shed some light on the competencies of the agents of the departments. In this respect, there is a form of turning point as the collection is contracted out to private businesses. When the departments take in charge the collection, the main stake is that of managing equipment. SWM requires costly equipment such as compactors, skip loaders, roll on-roll off, tipper trucks, side loaders, pay loaders, tractors, etc. At the operational level, the agents have to define the routes the trucks will use and the priority areas. They make their decisions according to the available resources. The financing of repair works and fuel is the most important to understand the service provision under this system.

In Burkina Faso, the municipal departments are still taking in charge fuel allocations and vehicles repairs. In Ouagadougou, primary collection has been entirely privatised but the *Direction de la Propreté* is still involved in the transportation of about half the waste collected. In Bobo-Dioulasso, public door-to-door collection was never put in place. The equipment granted under the Second Urban Project by the World Bank needs to be replaced or refurbished and the current equipment amounted to one truck and a dozen of containers at the end of 2008. The *Service Propreté* empties a handful of containers located in strategic places, mostly markets.

In Ghana, since their creations, the WMDs have enjoyed their own workshops. Fuel used to be available in the departments yards but it is now provided through vouchers to be used in private filling stations. In Accra, the department has virtually no equipment as no investment was made since the Second Urban Development Project.<sup>9</sup> In 1999, solid waste collection was contracted out to a Canadian business, *City & Country Waste Ltd. (CCWL)*. In 2001, the

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<sup>9</sup> Both countries had their Second Urban Development Project approved at the end of the 1980s. They included credits for support to the policies of SWM.

election of the John Kufuor Government led to the cancellation of the contract. The argument put forward was that of the opacity of the procurement process but the main reason was that the metropolitan assembly couldn't cope with the cost of the service. In July 2001, the company's equipment was distributed to private companies related to the newly elected government. In exchange, these companies signed franchise agreements for the collection of waste. As a result, the collection of waste has not been carried out by the WMD since 1999.

In Kumasi, the shift from public to private provision was not so radical. In 2008, the WMD contracted out the last zone in which it was operating. But the privatisation process had started in the early years of UESP I, when two companies had been awarded zones.<sup>10</sup> Full privatisation actually happened with the second phase of the project and led to the division of the city in 11 zones awarded to nine enterprises in January 2008. Since then, the equipment of the WMD is used for other activities such as street cleansing or public works.

Significant differences can be observed in the historical structuring of the departments. In Burkina Faso, there is not such thing as an autonomous body of Environmental Health Officers and almost no exchange of staff between the cities. In Ghana, on the contrary, SWM is more impacted by national policies as the staff is nominated by a government agency and funds are also frequently provided by the government to clean up the cities.

### ***3. The Emergence of Managerial Competencies in the Waste Management Departments***

The restructuring of the departments led to a shift in competencies at the WMDs' level. The "image"<sup>11</sup> of the local civil servant was transformed as new competencies were promoted in the fields of private sector regulation, human resources management, financial management and communication. In the wake of the project, the expectations concerning the agents of the WMDs evolved markedly.

#### ***3.1. A New Image of the Policy***

In Ghana, the first phase of UESP included a capacity-building component called *Project-Wide Capacity-Building & Training* (PWCBT).<sup>12</sup> It financed the intervention of the British consultancy – Carlbro – whose mission started in the early years of the project and ended with the closure of the phase I, in 2003. The consultants were involved in the writing of the *Environmental Sanitation Policy* and the *Strategic Framework for the Development of Capacity for Environmental Health and Management* (MLGRD, 1999; 2001b). They also produced a number of key documents for the sanitation sector (MLGRD, 2002a, b, c). In fact, the main options of reforms had been stated during the preparation of the project – before 1996 – and the British consultancy was in charge of their implementation. A lot of expertise and considerable sums of money were invested in the training of civil servants. Carlbro even participated to an evaluation of the teachings in the three Schools of Hygiene of the country ((MLGRD, 2001a).

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<sup>10</sup> *Kumasi Waste Management Ltd* (KWML) and *Messrs Waste Group Ltd*, the later obtained the contract in 2001 through *International Competitive Bidding* (ICB).

<sup>11</sup> See. Dubois and Dulong (1999) and the introduction to the first session of this section by Renaud Payre and Julie Gervais.

<sup>12</sup> The Nordic Development Fund, financed the consultants, and the Association of Netherlands Municipalities, took in charge the training program.

In Burkina Faso, the reform followed a similar process. The evolution of the regulatory framework happened in the first years of the project<sup>13</sup> and a Canadian consultancy – Dessau Soprin – provided the expertise needed in the waste management field. The capacity-building component of the PACVU project, however, concentrated on the issue of local resource mobilisation. The decision was made to introduce a *Taxes de Résidence* (TR) with the aim of financing SWM. This component also included a series of small-scale projects in the field of civil society participation. Contrarily to what happened in Ghana, the attempt to redefine the competencies of the local civil servants did not amount to more than a few workshops and the presence of the international consultants of Dessau-Soprin and a handful of local consultants.

In Accra, one agent reminds that in the middle of the 1980s, apart from the Head and the head of the workshop, the labour force was unqualified.<sup>14</sup> Since then, there appears to have been an evolution towards a greater complexity of the tasks of the civil servants. Most of the unskilled labourers were progressively transferred to the submetros, but the payroll of skilled agents – mostly Environmental Health Officers – increased. The changes in the relations with the private sector are well illustrated by the *Strategic Framework for the Development of Capacity for Environmental Health and Management in Ghana*:

*“[Waste Management] is a high priority, especially in major cities and towns. Much development in this area will be through public-private partnerships, requiring the development of efficient monitoring and contract management systems as well as building capacity in the private sector.” (MLGRD, 2001b: 17).*

In fact, the urban development projects implemented in Burkina Faso and Ghana supported a new conception of SWM. The whole idea of privatisation made it necessary to focus on the costs and the measurement, for the first time, of the service provided. The civil servants were under a new prescription, the rationalisation of the service. Until fairly recently, the departments had not had an autonomous financial management. They were dependent on the *Head Offices* for the budgeting of the investments and running costs. And apart from the case of Bobo-Dioulasso where the change was negligible, the budgets of the SWM increased in all cities.

Two fundamental changes gave a renewed importance to the financial management aspects of the policy. Firstly, as they are responsible of the monitoring of the contracts, the WMDs have to give their approval for the payment of the bills of the private contractors. Thus, they have to check the service that they provide. The contract determines the price that the local government has to give to the contractors for the transportation of the waste. The checks are made at the level of the landfill site. Each truck is weighed and the reports from the landfill sites are the basis for the payments by the Finance Department of the Assembly. To understand the importance of this transformation, one has to think about the functioning of the departments before the reforms. This is made easier by the observations of the situation in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso where full privatisation has not happened. To calculate the costs of the transportation of a ton of waste by the *Direction de la Propreté* in Ouagadougou, for example, is virtually impossible. These costs are melted with other expenses, and it is

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<sup>13</sup> In Burkina Faso, decree n° 95-176/PRES/MFP/MATS dated May 23, 1995 instituted a fee for solid waste collection. Less than two years later, Law n° 005/97/ADP dated January 30, 1997 created the Code of the Environment. In 1998, decree n° 98-323/PRES/PM/MEE/MATS/MIHU/MS/MTT regulated the collection, transportation, treatment and elimination of urban waste.

<sup>14</sup> *Source*: Interview with KPODO, Principal Environmental Health Technologist, Accra, WMD, Oct. 22, 2008.

impossible to isolate them.<sup>15</sup> Under a privatised system of waste management, the calculation of the costs of the service is simplified by the fact that it is stated in a contract.

Another transformation is associated to the rationalisation of the policies of SWM. Both UESP and PACVU projects had selected the objective of the improvement of the collection rate as a major one.<sup>16</sup> During the preparation of the projects, some preliminary studies were carried out in order to provide estimates of the annual production of waste in the cities.<sup>17</sup> Although the data was not fully reliable, the preparation of the projects made essential the question of the quantities of waste produced. In addition, the opening of the landfill sites meant that the civil servants could have a precise idea of the quantities that were actually evacuated from the city. This led to a shift in the representations of the civil servants. The conception of the *clean* city was originally centred on what could be seen. It was thus important that the garbage heap be not too numerous and obviously not on the *ceremonial roads*. What was at stake in this conception was the image of the city, its prestige. The importance of the prestige is still there now, but the waste management policies are less and less based on *what can be seen*. The efficiency of the policy can now be measured through the collection rate. This measure is not only more precise, it is more abstract. In the case of the city of Accra, this is extremely important. The city being located on the seashores, it has always been current to dump refuse in the sea or in the nearby rivers that would take them away. With the current conception of the cleanliness of the city, these practices become illegitimate for the civil servants.

The relationship between the civil servants and the populations also evolved during the implementation of the projects. Historically, the latter had always tried to mobilise the public for the cleanliness of the city. In the 1980s, the military governments of Captain Thomas Sankara (Burkina Faso) and Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings (Ghana) adopted a strong attitude towards what they regarded as uncivil behaviours of the inhabitants. They created sanitation committees in each neighbourhood. This authoritarian relationship to the issue of sanitation has now largely been replaced with the introduction of the monthly fee for the collection of household waste. In this respect, the citizens become *clients* of the municipality. Together with the private contractors, the civil servants have to convince them to pay the fee.<sup>18</sup> The *polluter pays* principle however it is not fully implemented has become the norm for the civil servants. Their task is no longer to use the scarce resources to clean the places where dirt was visible. The logic of their profession is now to generate new resources from the contribution of the citizens in order to compensate the expenses associated with the increase in the quantities collected. There is a deeper understanding of the financial equilibrium needed for

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<sup>15</sup> The main expenses are the maintenance and the fuel expenses. These are made by the *Direction des Services Municipaux* (DSTM) for all the administrative departments. This complexity allows the local governments of Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso to argue that the public provision of the service is cheaper than the contracting-out of the service, and it is impossible for the World Bank to invalidate this claim.

<sup>16</sup> The *Staff Appraisal Report* of the PACVU did not give any precise figure but the World Bank put forward an improvement from 40 to 55% of the collection rate for Ouagadougou on the duration of the project (World Bank, 2005: 22). In Ghana, the *Staff Appraisal Report* of the UESP project gave estimates of the collection rates – based on interviews with civil servants – of 60-65% in Accra and 45-50% in Kumasi (World Bank, 1996: 66). At the closure of the project, it was estimated that these rates had stagnated to 63% in Accra and improved to 77% in Kumasi versus an objective of 70% in Accra and 60% in Kumasi (World Bank, 2004: 8).

<sup>17</sup> For the city of Ouagadougou, a study by the IAGU-GREA estimated the production at 0.54 kg per person per day (IAGU-GREA, 1996). This study was used by the Dessau-Soprin team to proportion the infrastructures and the financial resources needed for a satisfactory collection rate in the city.

<sup>18</sup> However, the reluctance of the local authorities to impose the payment is obvious in both countries. In Ouagadougou, the transfer stations had been designed so that the citizens could not access them but this was revised as it became clear that the people that would not or could not pay would dump their refuse in the streets. In Accra, it was made clear from the beginning that the communal container system would stay the norm in the popular areas.

the provision of the service. The departments, as they are managed today, are characterised by a different relation to the resources. The perception that the municipality cannot cope with the costs of SWM slowly imposed itself and most civil servants now consider that the only option for improving the service is to extend the number of households that pay a fee to the private contractors.

### ***3.2. The Careers of the Civil Servants in the Cities of Ouagadougou, Bobo-Dioulasso, Accra and Kumasi***

A number of transformations can be identified; they are linked to a displacement of the power among the units that constitute the WMD. When the WMD is operating the waste collection, the drivers and the mechanics have an important role. But when the system is privatised, they come to be completely marginalised. Other categories of staff deal with the contractors.

The career of Mr. Amoah, from the Accra WMD can give us some insights on the evolution of the competencies over the years. He graduated from Kumasi University of Science and Technology at the end of the 1970s. In the years 1980s, he occupied the position of Head of department for two years, before the current head was nominated. At that time, Mr. Amoah was by far the most qualified worker of the department, and this led him to the position of Head of the workshop. As such, he was the main counterpart of the German project, and benefited from training and the reorganization of the workshop. To date, 35 persons work under his authority, but the department hardly has a truck in good state. Since the privatisation in 1999, the workshop is not really relevant to the policy of SWM. Interestingly, Mr. Amoah became an organizational consultant. In October 2008, he was the “facilitator” of a very important seminar that took place in the WMD: the preparation of the *Strategic Sanitation Plan*. In the wake of the introduction of the *Medium-Term Expenditure Framework* (MTEF) of financial management of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly, the WMD had to hand an *Action Plan* as part of the budget preparation. Mr. Amoah was responsible for the organization of this workshop.

Another example can be given for the Accra WMD. In 2007, we met Mr. Oduro, a young Sanitary Engineer from the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Environment (MLGRD) that was placed on secondment at the WMD in order to help the team to prepare a SWM strategy to be submitted to the World Bank as part of the second phase of UESP. According to several interviews, Mr. Oduro was marginalised in the WMD. The other members of staff would often not consider appropriate to pass on the information to him. However, he was the one that drafted the strategy submitted to the World Bank (AMA, 2007). Mr. Oduro completed an M.Sc. Program in Air Quality Control, Solid Waste and Waste Water Process Engineering from the University of Stuttgart. In his Master Thesis he studied the management of landfills in Ghana. As such, Mr. Oduro was by far the person that best mastered the relevant competencies for dealing with the projects at the end of the years 2000s. But his integration in the Accra WMD was difficult and he ended up asking for another position when the pilot project he was in charge of was abandoned.

Mr Kpodo is another member of the Accra Waste Management Department. He has been in charge of the Monitoring Unit since 1999:

*Well, when I came here in 1994 we had equipment ourselves so I was supervising. I was actually on the job, doing the work, collecting waste. But in 1999 when we went to 100% privatisation of waste collection, then I was made to monitor. And that was more a difficult job than even the supervision. Because in this case you do the work yourself and you know what you have done. But when you are monitoring somebody's doing you have to be chasing to find out*

*whether it has been done, write your reports. It was new to us. So since 1999, I've been engaged in monitoring of solid waste collection. (Interview, October 22, 2008)*

From 1999 to 2001, the Monitoring Unit was actively involved in the supervision of the company CCWL. At this time, Mr. Kpodo worked with four younger EHOs that would go in the field to monitor the work of the contractors. Progressively, the *Monitoring Unit* was no longer considered as an important unit. Around the time when UESP I closed Mr. Kpodo was left alone with his job. He never goes out in the city as he has no motorbike or fuel for his car. The relations with the contractors, although they were a major axis of the intervention of UESP PWCBT, are virtually limited to weighing of the quantities at the entrance of the landfill sites. This task is under the responsibility of Mr. Bley, the Deputy Head of the department.

The career of the Director of Kumasi WMD indicates the point to which the boundary between the civil servant and the local consultant is becoming blurred. Mr. Tony Mensah obtained a diploma in Civil Engineering from KUST in 1987. As such he was present in the last years of the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) intervention previous to the creation of the WMD in 1994. Mr. Mensah served as a landfill manager until 1994 when he left and was granted a scholarship for UK for M.Sc. Program (1994-1996) and benefited from an internship in Leicestershire in the Waste Management section. He came back in 1997 when he was made the Deputy Head of the WMD. In 2000, he left this position as he was recruited by the UESP project as a *Project Engineer*. In 2003, at the closure of UESP, he was appointed director of WMD. And at the start of the implementation of the second phase of the project he was made *Project Coordinator* for the city. He is thus directly in relation with the project team in Accra and serves as an intermediary with the local civil servants in all areas.

In conclusion, the analysis of the implementation of the World Bank projects in the field of solid waste management in Burkina Faso and Ghana reveals the close link between the reforms and the competencies of the civil servants. In somewhat different professional and political contexts, the roles of the civil servants have evolved in parallel ways. The expertise and the trainings provided promoted a largely homogeneous model of competency in the four cities, but the actual changes rather seem to originate in the new modes of solid waste management. The reshaping of the stakes and the ideas on the policy enabled a new set of professional practices to emerge. These are actually the driving force between the institutionalisation of new competencies in the Waste Management Departments.

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